

Federal Court



Cour fédérale

Date: 20241023

Docket: T-2304-24

Citation: 2024 FC 1683

Ottawa, Ontario, October 23, 2024

PRESENT: The Honourable Justice Fuhrer

BETWEEN:

INDIGO BOOKS & MUSIC INC.

Moving Party / Plaintiff

and

**JOHN DOE 1 dba INDIGO KILLS KIDS,
JOHN DOE 2 dba INDIGOKILLSKIDS.CA, and
JOHN DOE 3 dba INDIGOKILLSKIDS.COM**

Defendants

and

**BELL CANADA,
ROGERS COMMUNICATIONS CANADA INC.,
TELUS COMMUNICATIONS INC.,
VIDEOTRON LTD. and
FREEDOM MOBILE INC.**

Third Party Respondents

ORDER AND REASONS

UPON the Plaintiff's amended notice of return of motion for an interlocutory order against the Third Party Respondents pursuant to section 44 of the *Federal Courts Act*, RSC 1985, c F-7, subsection 34(1) of the *Copyright Act*, RSC 1985, c C-42, and subsection 53.2(1) of the *Trademarks Act*, RSC 1985, c T-13, filed on October 8, 2024 and heard on October 22, 2024;

AND UPON reading the Plaintiff's supporting material for the motion originally filed on September 11, 2024 and for the return of motion filed on October 8, 2024, including the affidavits of Damien Liddle and Colleen Stanley, the additional affidavits of Andrew Johnstone and Damien Liddle, and the affidavit of Riley Sun, and the pleadings and proceedings to date;

AND UPON hearing the submissions of counsel for the Plaintiff, and noting that the Defendants, who were served with the amended notice of return of motion, are unrepresented, have not defended the action, and were absent from the hearing, while all the Third Party Respondents are represented and, with the exception of Bell Canada, were present at the hearing;

AND UPON considering that Third Party Respondents take no position on the issuance of this Order as it concerns them;

AND UPON finding that the Plaintiff has satisfied the Court an interlocutory domain blocking order for a duration of two years is warranted in the circumstances for the following reasons and on the terms ordered:

Overview and Applicable Principles

[1] I find that the Plaintiff has met the test for an interlocutory domain blocking or site-blocking order, further to the Court's interim domain blocking order issued on September 17, 2024 (as amended on September 19, 2024) and having neutral citation 2024 FC 1465 [Interim Order]. I note that the Interim Order contains a term limiting it to fourteen (14) days from the date of issuance unless the Court orders otherwise. Upon the Plaintiff's request, and by way of

Order dated October 1, 2024, I extended the Interim Order until the hearing on October 22, 2024 and the Court has issued a decision (i.e. this Order) following the hearing.

[2] A domain blocking or site-blocking order is a form of injunctive relief enjoining Internet Service Providers [ISPs] to block their subscribers' attempts to access infringing domains and related content on the Internet. A more technical description of site-blocking can be found in *Bell Media Inc v GoldTV.Biz*, 2019 FC 1432 [*GoldTV*] at paras 14-20.

[3] The Plaintiff seeks a static (as opposed to dynamic) site-blocking order known as Domain Name System [DNS] blocking, limited to the specific domains or subdomains involved, thus diminishing the risk that untargeted websites nonetheless could be affected by the order. As noted in the Interim Order, it is settled law that this Court has the jurisdiction to issue the type of site-blocking order the Plaintiff seeks: *GoldTV*, above at paras 22-26.

[4] The Third Party Respondents, Bell Canada, Rogers Communications Canada Inc., Telus Communications Inc., and Videotron Ltd. and Freedom Mobile Inc., are the ISPs at issue in this matter. Together, they account for about 90% of the mobile and Internet subscriptions in Canada.

[5] Freedom Mobile Inc. is a new Third Party Respondent to the returned motion, further to the affidavit of Riley Sun dated October 16, 2024. While it is related to Videotron Ltd., Freedom Mobile Inc. nonetheless is a separate legal entity; hence its inclusion in the proceeding.

[6] I note that none of the Third Party Respondents objects to the form and content of the Order below (that was presented to the Court in draft prior to the hearing of the return motion) and, further, all of the Third Party Respondents take no position on the issuance of the Order as it relates to them.

[7] The test for interlocutory injunctive relief is the conjunctive three-part test articulated in the following line of cases: *Manitoba (Attorney General) v Metropolitan Stores Ltd*, 1987 CanLII 79 (SCC), [1987] 1 SCR 110; *RJR-MacDonald v Canada (Attorney General)*, 1994 CanLII 117 (SCC), [1994] 1 SCR 311. In short, to succeed on its motion for an interlocutory domain blocking order, the Plaintiff must satisfy all three elements of the test — serious issue, irreparable harm, and balance of convenience: *Janssen Inc v Abbvie Corporation*, 2014 FCA 112 at para 14. See also *Bell Canada v 1326030 Ontario Inc (iTVBox.net)*, 2016 FC 612 [iTVBox] at para 19.

[8] *GoldTV* further guides (at para 56, citing *iTVBox*), that a strong showing on one element of the three-part test may lower the threshold on the other two.



[9] As also noted in the Interim Order, more recent jurisprudence of this Court has established the appropriateness of the following factors, known as the *Cartier* factors, in determining the proportionality of a site-blocking order in the context of whether it would be a just and equitable remedy in all the circumstances: (a) necessity; (b) effectiveness; (c) dissuasiveness; (d) complexity and cost; (e) barriers to legitimate use or trade; (f) fairness; (g) substitution; and (h) safeguards. See *GoldTV*, above at paras 51-52; appeal dismissed *Teksavvy*

Solutions Inc v Bell Media Inc, 2021 FCA 100 [*Teksavvy*]; leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed (SCC File No. 39876). The Federal Court of Appeal in *Teksavvy* held specifically (at para 77) that the Court in *GoldTV* appropriately considered the *Cartier* factors.

Evidentiary Findings

[10] As outlined in the Interim Order, the Plaintiff's evidence describes that it is Canada's largest and most recognized book, gift, stationery, home decor, and specialty toy retailer that has been operating since 1997. The Plaintiff operates physical retail locations and provides online retail services.

[11] The Plaintiff owns the following registered trademarks in Canada [INDIGO Marks]:

Trademark	Type	Registration No.	Registration Date
INDIGO	Word	TMA510146	1999-03-26
	Design	TMA967316	2017-04-03
!NDIGOKIDS	Word	TMA816679	2013-10-01
	Design	TMA1093433	2021-02-10

[12] The Plaintiff asserts use of the trademark !NDIGOKIDS Design since at least as early as 2008 in association with children's books, apparel, toys, and gifts at its retail and online stores.

[13] The Plaintiff also asserts ownership of copyright in the following image [!NDIGOKIDS Work]:



[14] In support of the asserted copyright, the affidavit of Damien Liddle dated September 26, 2024 [Supplemental Liddle Affidavit] in the Plaintiff's (amended) Supplemental Motion Record, filed in connection with the return of motion, attests to and attaches as exhibits a confirmatory copyright assignment and moral rights waiver dated September 18, 2024 from Bruce Mau who created the !NDIGOKIDS Design in 1997, and Canadian copyright registration No. 1223882 dated September 18, 2024 for the !NDIGOKIDS Design. I note that the trademark !NDIGOKIDS Design and the !NDIGOKIDS Work are identical and the use of these designations is a matter of context. In other words, nothing turns on the use of either designation.

[15] The Plaintiff's evidence also describes that in about mid August 2024, it became aware that the John Doe Defendants (i.e. the as yet unidentified Defendants) operate the IKK Website and IKK Domains, as well the IKK Social Media [all collectively, IKK Platforms]. In the Plaintiff's motion filed on September 11, 2024, the IKK Website is defined as the website hosted at www.indigokillskids.ca, while the IKK Domains are defined as collectively the website domains, www.indigokillskids.ca and www.indigokillskids.com. The IKK Social Media include the IKK Website and others used by the John Doe Defendants, as well as Instagram (www.instagram.com/indigokillskids/ and www.instagram.com/indigokillskids.ca), TikTok (@indigokillskids) and X (formerly Twitter) (x.com/indigokillskids/) accounts.

[16] The IKK Platforms display the following image [IKK Image]:



[17] In addition to the express message conveyed by the IKK Image (i.e. that the Plaintiff is responsible for killing children), the IKK Website calls for a boycott of the Plaintiff's stores, redirects visitors to competitors of the Plaintiff, and claimed to be organizing a day of action against the Plaintiff on September 25, 2024.

[18] The Supplemental Liddle Affidavit describes the ongoing IKK activities even after the Interim Order issued. Social media handles that contain "indigokillskids" continue unabated. Subsequent to the Interim Order, the Plaintiff learned from one of the Third Party Respondents that it is not possible to block individual third party social media accounts with a site-blocking order. The site-blocking cannot target sub-domains (i.e. the individual social media handles) without site-blocking the entire platform. According to the Plaintiff, it may be possible target the sub-domains through the separate interlocutory injunction which the Plaintiff also seeks on its motion against the John Doe Defendants.

[19] Regardless, the Plaintiff discovered that, as of September 19, 2024, less than 48 hours after the Interim Order issued, the contents from the IKK Domains reappeared at boycottindigobooks.com [New Domain], indicating this was "a temporary parking spot."

[20] The New Domain hosts a website that is nearly identical to that previously hosted on the Defendants. The webpage hosted at the New Domain continues to use the phrase “indigokillskids” [IKK Tagline].

[21] Further, IKK Social Media displays that following modified IKK Image, post Interim Order:



[22] A press release issued on September 24, 2024 displays the IKK Image prominently at the top. It describes the temporary shutdown of the boycott campaign website, IndigoKillsKids.ca, ordered by the Court (i.e. the Interim Order), as well as the relaunched campaign at boycottindigobooks.com.

[23] The Supplemental Liddle Affidavit also describes pop-up bus stop signs across Toronto featuring the IKK Tagline.

[24] On September 25, 2025, protests took place at a number of Indigo locations across Canada, and many featured the IKK Image or the IKK Tagline.

Analysis

[25] Noting that the applicable test is essentially the same (as between an order for interim versus interlocutory relief), my analysis here simply expands on the analysis in the Interim Order.

[26] Turning to the applicable three-part test, I am persuaded that the Plaintiff has shown a *prima facie* case of copyright infringement regarding the !INDIGOKIDS Work, and at least a serious issue, if also not a *prima facie* case, concerning the depreciation of the goodwill attaching to the INDIGO Marks, particularly !INDIGOKIDS and !indigokids Design.

[27] First, I find that the IKK Image is a substantial copy of the !INDIGOKIDS Work, in respect of which the Plaintiff has substantiated ownership of copyright, down to the font, colour and graphics of the work, with the word “kills” inserted between “!ndigo” and “kids.”

[28] Second, I continue to agree with the Plaintiff that the apparent purpose of the IKK Platforms is to damage the Plaintiff’s business and reputation, including tarnishing the INDIGO Marks and depreciating the value of the attendant goodwill, through the message inherent in the IKK Image and IKK Tagline and other content and messages on the IKK Platforms implicating the INDIGO Marks. In other words, the Defendants intentionally have attempted to attract the Plaintiff’s consumers to their own website for notoriety and in a manner likely, on its face, to tarnish the goodwill attached to the INDIGO Marks: *United Airlines, Inc v Cooperstock*, 2017 FC 616 at para 102.

[29] Turning to the next elements of the test, I also am persuaded that the Plaintiff's strong showing on the first part lowers the threshold for the remaining two prongs.

[30] Regarding irreparable harm, generally the Plaintiff must show with clear, convincing evidence that this is a harm which is non-compensable by a monetary award. The requirement is met here, in my view, where the Defendants are anonymous and have made efforts to remain that way and avoid liability or responsibility: *Teksavvy*, above at para 87. I provide two examples.

[31] First, following the issuance of the Interim Order, the Court issued a direction requesting that one Charlotte Kates, an individual ostensibly associated with the IKK Website according to legal counsel, as well as the Legal Centre for Palestine [LCP], a potential intervener, provide the Court with evidence of their standing to participate in the proceedings (in the case of Charlotte Kates) and their motion for intervention (in the case of the LCP). Neither complied with the direction by the mandated deadline, nor to date.

[32] Second, an X post by "Indigo Kills Kids" acknowledges the Court's "temporary injunction on our domains for 14 days" and describes themselves as "Your friendly faceless internet trolls." The latter statement in particular reinforces my view that the John Doe Defendants actively seek to remain anonymous and to avoid liability or responsibility for their actions.

[33] Regarding the *Cartier* factors, I am satisfied that they, along with the balance of convenience, favour the Plaintiff.

Cartier Factors

- Necessity (and Proportionality)

[34] The factor of necessity is closely linked to irreparable harm: *GoldTV*, above at para 53. As the Plaintiff's evidence shows, the John Doe Defendants have ignored the Interim Order and they actively continue to conceal their identity. The Plaintiff argues, and I agree, that the interlocutory injunction will stop use of the IKK Domains, pending the resolution of arbitral CDRP and UDRP domain name proceedings, and prevent the domains from resolving to websites involving *prima facie* copyright infringement, as well as likely depreciation of goodwill attaching to the INDIGO Marks.

[35] Further, the order sought is proportional in that it is limited to DNS blocking (where an ISP can prevent a particular domain name or web address from properly translating into its corresponding Internet Protocol [IP] address), and does not include the other primary methods of site-blocking, namely IP address blocking and Uniform Resource Locator path blocking.

- Effectiveness

[36] As mentioned above, the Third Party Respondents, including the added Freedom Mobile Inc., represent about 90% of the mobile and Internet subscriptions in Canada. That said, the Plaintiff acknowledges that the Interim Order has not eliminated user access to the infringing activities, in light of the ongoing infringing activities via social media.

[37] As observed in *GoldTV* (at para 75), however, “in those jurisdictions where site-blocking measures have been implemented there has been a significant reduction in visits to infringing websites.”

[38] In the circumstances, I am satisfied that an interlocutory site-blocking order is an effective method of at least limiting access to the infringing IKK Website.

- *Dissuasiveness*

[39] The Plaintiff’s evidence demonstrates that the IKK Website redirects users to competitors of the Plaintiff. In my view, an interlocutory site-blocking order will limit access to this “service” provided by the John Doe Defendants via the IKK Website.

- *Complexity and Cost*

[40] The Plaintiff points to jurisprudence of this Court, including *GoldTV*, *Rogers Media Inc v John Doe 1*, 2022 FC 775, and *Rogers Media Inc v John Doe 1*, 2024 FC 1082, as examples where ISPs, such as the Third Party Respondents, have implemented both static and dynamic site-blocking orders with limited costs and no material technical issues. Apart from the inability of the Third Party Respondents to target sub-domains (i.e. social media handles) without site-blocking the entire platform, no other material complexity (or associated cost) has been raised.

[41] Regardless, because the Third Party Respondents do not object to the form and content of the Order below, I am prepared to infer that they considered these factors. In other words, these factors do not weigh against the issuance of this Order.

- Barriers to Legitimate Trade

[42] As noted above, the Defendants intentionally have attempted to attract the Plaintiff's consumers to their own website for notoriety. The legitimacy of trade offered by the IKK Website (i.e. redirection to competitors of the Plaintiff) is minimal at best, in my view, and does not militate against the issuance of the Order.

[43] Regardless, I am satisfied that the Order will not prevent customers for the Third Party Respondents from accessing lawful content. For example, the Order is limited to the IKK Domains. The operators of the domains or any service customer affected by the Order can apply to the Court to seek a variance. There is a mechanism for the addition and removal of domains and subdomains and for the Third Party Respondents to raise issues relating to the technical implementation of the Order. In addition, the Plaintiff is obligated to post the Order, along with an explanation, on a separate website domain. In my view, all of these measures will minimize any barriers to legitimate trade.

- Fairness

[44] The *prima facie* copyright infringement and likely depreciation of goodwill to the INDIGO Marks tip the fairness balance in favour the Plaintiff, in my view, especially in light of

the ongoing IKK activities mentioned above. Further, in itself, the Order is not one that engages freedom of expression values or interferes with the principle of net-neutrality: *Google Inc v Equustek Solutions Inc*, 2017 SCC 34.

- Substitution and Risk

[45] The Order provides a mechanism for adding other domains where the John Doe Defendants actively circumvent it through different domains.

- Safeguards

[46] As noted under the heading “Barriers to Legitimate Trade” above, the Order contains a mechanism for amendment, updating and removal of domains and subdomains, and addresses inadvertent over-blocking.

[47] I make the above findings for the purpose of this motion, recognizing that if this matter proceeds to trial, the trial judge likely will have a fuller record on which to consider these issues anew in the context of a request for permanent injunctive relief.

AND UPON concluding, for the above reasons, that an interlocutory domain blocking order will issue on the terms outlined below.

ORDER in T-2304-24

THIS COURT’S ORDER is that:

1. Subject to the terms of this Order, the Third Party Respondent Freedom Mobile Inc. shall within seven (7) days after the issuance of this Order, and the other Third Party Respondents shall continue to block, or attempt to block access by their respective residential internet service customers and, if technically feasible and reasonably practicable, their mobile network service customers (the “**Internet Services**”), to each of the domains and subdomains identified in Schedule 1 of this Order (the “**Infringing Domains**”), subject to any subsequent variance to this Order or amendment to Schedule 1.
2. Schedule 1 to this Order and the list of Infringing Domains may, with leave of the Court, be updated through the following mechanism:
 - (a) the Plaintiff may serve and file a motion to amend Schedule 1 and add additional domains and subdomains with appropriate evidence and submissions to support the motion, including affidavit and/or any other admissible evidence demonstrating a strong *prima facie* case of similar infringement in the domain name or website content of the additional domain(s) and subdomain(s);
 - (b) a Third Party Respondent may bring a motion to object to the additional proposed domain(s) and subdomain(s) by serving and filing a motion record within ten (10) business days of service of the Plaintiffs’ affidavit and proposed amended Order;
 - (c) if no Third Party Respondent serves and files a motion record within in ten (10) business days in accordance with paragraph 2(b), the Court may grant the Order without further proceedings.
3. The Third Party Respondents have no obligation to verify whether the Plaintiff’s Schedule 1 to this Order, or updates to Schedule 1, are correct, and are wholly reliant on the Plaintiff accurately identifying the domains and subdomains associated with the Infringing Websites (as defined in the interlocutory injunction order issued in this matter contemporaneously with this Order having neutral citation 2024 FC 1684).

4. A Third Party Respondent will be deemed to have complied with paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Order if it uses domain name system (“DNS”) blocking, DNS re-routing or an alternative or equivalent technical means (provided that the Third Party Respondent provides reasonable notice to the Plaintiff of said alternative or equivalent means).
5. If a Third Party Respondent, in complying with this Order, is unable to implement DNS blocking, DNS re-routing or alternative or equivalent technical means, that Third Party Respondent shall, within ten (10) business days of this Order or of being first made aware it is unable to implement the blocking, as applicable, notify the Plaintiff of the step(s) it has taken and why it will be unable to comply with the Order. The Plaintiff shall treat any information received pursuant to this paragraph confidentially and shall use it solely for the purposes of monitoring compliance with this Order.
6. The Internet Service customers of the Third Party Respondent will be notified through the following mechanism:
 - (a) the Plaintiff shall post this Order, as well as an explanation of the purpose of the Order, on a separate website domain (the “**Notification Website**”) that will also make the following information immediately available:
 - i. that access has been blocked by this Order;
 - ii. the identity of the Plaintiff and the Federal Court File for this matter and contact information of the Plaintiff or its counsel;
 - iii. a statement to the effect that the operators of the Infringing Domains (i.e., the John Doe Defendants), any third party who claims to be affected by this Order, and any internet service customer affected by the Order, may apply to the Court to discharge or vary the Order pursuant to paragraph 11 below; and
 - (b) where an Internet Service customer has access to an Infringing Domain blocked by a Third Party Respondent pursuant to this Order, to the extent practicable, the Third Party Respondent shall setup the DNS blocking, DNS re-routing or an

alternative or equivalent technical means, to redirect the internet service customer to the Notification Website; and

- (c) the Plaintiff shall notify the Third Party Respondents of any changes to the domain or website address of the Notification Website as soon as reasonably practicable.

7. A Third Party Respondent shall not be in breach of this Order if it temporarily suspends its compliance with paragraphs 1 or 2, in whole or in part, when such suspension is reasonably necessary:

- (a) to correct or investigate potential over-blocking that is caused or suspected to be caused by the steps taken pursuant to paragraphs 1 or 2;
- (b) to maintain the integrity or quality of its internet services or the functioning of its network and/or system(s);
- (c) to upgrade, troubleshoot or maintain its internet services or blocking system(s), including as a result of technical or capacity limitations of its blocking system(s);
or
- (d) to prevent or respond to an actual or potential security threat to its network or systems;

provided, if the suspension lasts longer than 48 hours that the Third Party Respondent gives notice to the Plaintiff during or following such suspension and provides the reason for such suspension and an estimate of its duration. The Plaintiff shall treat any information received pursuant to this paragraph confidentially and shall use it solely for the purposes of monitoring and ensuring compliance with this Order.

8. For greater certainty a Third Party Respondent may hold a reasonable portion of its capacity to implement DNS blocking in reserve, if it deems it necessary to do so, in order to be able to respond to threats to its subscribers and to maintain the integrity of its network and services. Any such measure must be justified with reference to the network capacity used for similar purposes within the 12 months preceding this Order.

9. The Plaintiff must notify the Third Party Respondents as soon as reasonably practicable if:
 - (a) any domain(s) or subdomain(s) in Schedule 1 to this Order (as updated) no longer provides access to or redirects to the Infringing Domains or are transferred and assigned to the Plaintiff, in which case the Plaintiff shall immediately provide to the Third Party Respondents and file with the Court an updated Schedule 1 removing said domain(s) and subdomain(s) and the Third Party Respondents shall no longer be ordered to block or attempt to block access to said domain(s) or subdomains(s); or
 - (b) the operators of the Infringing Domains (i.e. the John Doe Defendants), the operators of any other website who claim to be affected by this Order, or any internet service customer affected by the Order, has applied to the Court to seek a variation of this Order pursuant to paragraph 11.
10. Notices and service of documents under this Order may be made by the Plaintiff and the Third Party Respondents to one another by electronic means at addresses to be determined and agreed upon by them. Service and filing of documents pursuant to paragraph 2 may be made no more frequently than every ten (10) business days.
11. The operators of the Infringing Domains (i.e. the John Doe Defendants), the operators of any other website or domain who claim to be affected by this Order, and any Internet Service customer of the Third Party Respondents affected by the Order, may bring a motion to seek a variation of this Order insofar as this Order affects their ability to access or distribute non-infringing content by serving and filing a motion record within thirty (30) days of the first occurrence of the event that allegedly effects them and that results from this Order.
12. This Order shall in no way limit the ability of a Third Party Respondent to seek to stay, vary, or set aside this Order or oppose on any basis any other related or similar Order sought by the Plaintiff or any other party. In particular, and without limitation, this Order shall in no way limit the ability of a Third Party Respondent to raise issues in connection

with the implementation of this Order on grounds relating to the technical implementation of this Order, impacts on a Third Party Respondent's services to its subscribers, or the effectiveness of the Order.

13. The Plaintiffs shall indemnify and save harmless the Third Party Respondents for:
 - (a) the reasonable marginal cost of implementing paragraphs 1 and 6(b) of this Order and updating the implementation of this Order in response to notifications and/or service from the Plaintiffs pursuant to paragraph 2; and
 - (b) any reasonably incurred loss, liability, obligation, claim, damages, costs (including defence costs), or expenses resulting from a third party complaint, demand, action, claim, application or similar proceeding whether administrative, judicial, or quasi-judicial in nature, in respect of the Third Party Respondents as a result of their compliance with the Order.

14. With respect to the costs referenced in paragraph 13(a) of this Order:
 - (a) the Third Party Respondents shall provide the Plaintiff with an invoice setting out the claimed cost elements and the total cost claimed after having complied with one or more terms of this Order;
 - (b) the Plaintiff shall, within thirty (30) days of receipt of the invoice, either (i) pay the invoice or (ii) serve and file a motion disputing the reasonableness of the costs claimed in the invoice, failing which the costs shall be deemed to be reasonable; and
 - (c) without prejudice to any other recourse through which a Third Party Respondent may seek reimbursement, in the event the Plaintiff fails to pay the invoice or serve and file the motion referred to in paragraph 14, the Third Party Respondents shall no longer be required to comply with terms of this Order with respect to the domains and subdomains to which the invoice relates.

15. This Order shall terminate two (2) years from the date of issuance, unless the Court orders otherwise.

16. There shall be no costs on the motion.

"Janet M. Fuhrer"

Judge

Schedule 1 – Infringing Domain(s) and Subdomain(s) to be blocked

Domain(s) to be blocked	Subdomain(s) to be blocked
Indigokillskids.ca	
Indigokillskids.com	

FEDERAL COURT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

DOCKET: T-2304-24

STYLE OF CAUSE: INDIGO BOOKS & MUSIC INC. v JOHN DOE 1 dba
INDIGO KILLS KIDS,JOHN DOE 2 dba
INDIGOKILLSKIDS.CA, and JOHN DOE 3 dba
INDIGOKILLSKIDS.COM AND BELL CANADA,
ROGERS COMMUNICATIONS CANADA INC.,
TELUS COMMUNICATIONS INC., VIDEOTRON
LTD. And FREEDOM MOBILE INC. (THIRD PARTY
RESPONDENTS)

PLACE OF HEARING: HELD VIA VIDEOCONFERENCE

DATE OF HEARING: OCTOBER 22, 2024

ORDER AND REASONS: FUHRER J.

DATED: OCTOBER 23, 2024

APPEARANCES:

Jeffrey A. Kaufman
Bradley Adams
May M. Cheng
Riley Sun

FOR THE MOVING PARTY / PLAINTIFF

Daniel Pink
Kristina Milbourn

FOR THE THIRD PARTY RESPONDENTS
(ROGERS COMMUNICATIONS CANADA INC.)

Tariq Qureshi

FOR THE THIRD PARTY RESPONDENTS
(TELUS COMMUNICATIONS INC.)

Zoé Foustokjian

FOR THE THIRD PARTY RESPONDENTS
(VIDEOTRON LTD. AND FREEDOM MOBILE INC.)

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

Jeffrey Kaufman Law
Toronto, Ontario

FOR THE MOVING PARTY / PLAINTIFF

Dipchand LLP
Toronto, Ontario

FOR THE MOVING PARTY / PLAINTIFF

Rogers Communications
Toronto, Ontario

FOR THE THIRD PARTY RESPONDENTS
(ROGERS COMMUNICATIONS CANADA INC.)

Telus Communications Inc.
Toronto, Ontario

FOR THE THIRD PARTY RESPONDENTS
(TELUS COMMUNICATIONS INC.)

Québecor Média Inc
Montréal, Quebec

FOR THE THIRD PARTY RESPONDENTS
(VIDEOTRON LTD. AND FREEDOM MOBILE INC.)